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ARGUMENT
I.

THE ACT NEED NOT BE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

A statute
where there

should not be declared unconstitutional,

is

an interpretation

of the statute which

would not violate constitutional prohibitions.
present case,

In the

the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (the

"Act") need not be declared unconstitutional, because a
constitutionally permissible interpretation is available.
Because the resolution of the present matter does not
require this Court to declare the Act unconstitutional,
Points II,

III

Brief

Appellees

of

Intermountain
largely

and IV, on pages 26 through 31, of the
McKay-Dee

Health Care,

irrelevant.

Inc.

Hospital
(the

Center

and

IHC Brief")

are

U

Appellants have not requested a

declaration that the Act is unconstitutional.
simply request

that the Act be correctly

Appellants
interpreted,

which interpretation requires both (1) that the language
of the Act be interpreted as written and in accord with
the stated legislative intent,
interpreted

so

as

not

to

and (2) that the Act be
violate

well-established

constitutional principles raised before the trial court.
1

Appellees' argument that this Court upheld the twoyear statute of limitations period for the commencement
of actions under the Act in Allen v. Intermountain Health
Care, Inc. , 635 P.2d 30 (Utah 1981), is not determinative
of how

the Act should be interpreted so as to avoid

making other provisions of the Act unconstitutional as
applied. 1

Similarly,

the existence of a legitimate

purpose for the two-year limitations period does is not
dispositive of a legitimate purpose, or even an intent,
on the part of the legislature to limit the ability of
plaintiffs to bring claims against health care providers
by

provisions

of

the

Act

other

than

the

by

the

limitations period.
The statement of legislative purpose appearing in
Utah Code Ann. , section 78-14-2 contains two parts.

The

1 The citations contained in the Brief of Appellees
Ivan D. Wright, M.D.; Harold Vonk, M.D.; and Ronald S.
Rankin, M.D. (the UM.D. Brief"), to articles in Forbes and
Time magazines are neither authoritative nor do they aid
in interpretation of the statute. The referenced cases,
likewise, relate only to the legitimacy of the two-year
statute of limitations and not to the other implementing
provisions of the Act.

2

first part identifies the justification for the two-vear
limitations period and states:
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the
legislature to provide a reasonable time in which
actions may be commenced against health care
providers while limiting that time to a specific
period for which professional liability insurance
premiums
can be
reasonably
and
accurately
calculated;...
(emphasis

added) .

The

second

part

identifies

the

justification for the procedural requirements of the Act,
which are the subject matter of the present appeal, and
states:
• . . and to provide other procedural changes to
expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims.
(emphasis added) .
legislative

Thus, matters of procedure have the

purpose

solely

of

expediting

"early

evaluation and settlement," not to impede in whole or in
part

the bringing of claims.

similarly

provide

Construction.

in

The implementing

R156-78A-4(1),

rules

"Liberal

These rules shall be liberally construed

to secure the just, speedy and economical determination
of

all

issues

legislature

did

presented
not

to

intend

3

the
that

division."
the

The

procedural

requirements

of

the

Act

function

to

limit

the

commencement of actions against health care providers.
The

legislative

intent

is

further

apparent

from

the

provisions of those sections of the statute discussed
under Argument II, below.

Unfortunately, the trial court

interpreted the procedural requirements

of the Act as

having a purpose of limiting the ability of plaintiffs to
bring claims.

Appellants' argument, both in its brief

and before the trial court, pointed out

that such an

interpretation is unconstitutional, as well as contrary
to the language of the statute.
interpretation

would

be

Because the contrary

unconstitutional,

the

interpretation encouraged by the Appellants constitutes
the preferred interpretation.
II,

SECTION 78-14-12(2)(b) DID NOT DEPRIVE
THE TRIAL COURT OF JURISDICTION,

The parties are in agreement that Section 78-1412(2) (b) states: "The request shall be mailed to all
health care providers named in the notice and request."
The issue on appeal is the effect of a failure to mail
the Request, in the absence of a statutory provision

4

either identifying mailing of the Request as a
prerequisite to filing a complaint or creating a
limitation on the jurisdiction of the courts.
The parties are also in agreement that the dismissal
of the present action by the trial court was based solely
on the undisputed fact that the Appellants did not mail a
copy of the request for prelitigation panel review (the
"Request") to the health care providers at the time it
was filed with the Division.
The primary issue on appeal is whether Appellants
failure to mail a copy of the Request to the health care
providers, notwithstanding that none of the health care
providers were at the time yet served with the notice of
intent to commence legal action (the "Notice")2 and
thereby subject to the jurisdiction of the Division (much
like an unserved defendant in litigation would not be
served with pleadings between active litigants) , was a
2 Since the health care providers were all served
with the Notice, the suggestion on pages 19 of the IHC
Brief that they were somehow deprived "warning" of the
pending action is incorrect. As a practical matter, all
of the defendants were aware of the proceedings. They did
not need a second notice.
5

decision of the part of the Appellants which thereby
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction.
The IHC Brief does not dispute that the question of
jurisdiction raised by the service of the Request upon a
defendant is a question of first impression before this
Court, and has not been previously addressed in any case
cited by either party.3
The defendant health care providers do not dispute
that they have not based their arguments that mailing of
the Request is jurisdictional on Section 78-14-12(2)
concerning the duties of the plaintiff, but have instead
extrapolated their argument from the larger citation to
3
The M.D. Brief incorrectly alleges that Malone v.
Parker, 826 P.2d 132, 136 (Utah 1992) and Carter v.
Milford Vallev Memorial HOSP., 996 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah
App. 2000) have disposed of the issue. However, in
Malone, the Court addressed the necessity of filing an
action within 60 days following the service of the Notice.
The Court did not consider the necessity of a
prelitigation panel review or the mailing of a Request,
under a prior version of the statute, because it held that
the issue was precluded by collateral estoppel. In
Carter, the Court considered the interpretation of the
term "health care provider" in the Act and did not address
the mailing of the Request. Since the Notice and Request
were both filed in the instant case, the referenced cases
discussing filing actually support the position of the
Appellants.

6

the duties of the Division found in Section 78-1412(1)(c):
(1) (a) The division shall provide a hearing panel
in alleged medical liability cases against health
care providers as defined in Section 78-14-3, except
dentists.
(b) (i) The division shall establish procedures for
prelitigation consideration of medical liability
claims for damages arising out of the provision of or
alleged failure to provide health care.
(ii) The division may establish rules necessary to
administer the process and procedures related to
prelitigation hearings and the conduct of
prelitigation hearings in accordance with Sections
78-14-12 through 78-14-16.
(c) The proceedings are informal, nonbinding, and
are not subject to Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act, but are compulsory as
a condition precedent to commencing litigation.
(d) Proceedings conducted under authority of this
section are confidential, privileged, and immune from
civil process.
(Emphasis added) . Moreover, defendants acknowledge that
Sections 78-14-12(3) (c) (i) 4 and 78-14-12(3) (b) (i) and

4 The defendant health care providers do not dispute
that pursuant to Utah Code Ann., section 78-1412(3) (c) (i) , the parties may waive the prelitigation
requirements of the Act.

7

(ii) , provide circumstances where the said proceedings
are not required at all.
The cases cited on pages 15 and 16 of the IHC Brief
are very helpful in guiding the proper interpretation of
the Act.

First, the statute should not be rewritten "to

conform to an intention not expressed. " Arredondo v. Avis
Rent A Car System, Inc., 2001 UT 29, 24 P.3d 928.
Second, "The primary role of statutory interpretation is
to give effect to the intent of the legislature in light
of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Beaver
County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 916 P.2d 344, 358 (Utah
1996).

Third, the "statute should be construed as a

5 The defendant health care providers do not dispute
that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. , section 78-14-12 (3) (b) (i)
and (ii) , the prelitigation requirements of the Act are
eliminated if the Division fails to complete the procedure
within 180 days "after the filing" of a Request. Contrary
to the implication of the IHC Brief, there is no
requirement stated within section 78-14-12 (3) (b) that any
post-filing procedure otherwise be measured for
completeness. Instead, all such post-filing requirements
are automatically deemed satisfied. Therefore, filing
only can be considered a jurisdictional issue in the
interpretation of the Act. The M.D. Brief actually
acknowledges this conclusion on pages 11 and 12,
substituting the mailing requirement for its own condition
that the Division somehow "accept" the Request.
8

comprehensive whole." id.

Finally, "Statutory enactments

are to be construed as to render all parts thereof
relevant and meaningful." Platts v. Parents Helping
Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997).

What happens

after the Request is filed with the Division is not
jurisdictional, but is a mere matter of post-filing
procedure which the legislature did not intend to make
jurisdictional.

At the very least, the legislative

intent dictates that such post-filing procedures be
resolved by the Division or the courts consistent with
its expressed intent "to provide other procedural changes
to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims,"
and not be construed as an additional statutory barrier
to the commencement of an action against a health care
provider.6

See Utah Code Ann., Section 78-14-2 and Utah

6 if the legislature had intended that all procedural
items be jurisdictional prerequisites, they would not have
included the language in Section 78-14-12 (3) (b) (ii), "the
claimant is considered to have complied with all
conditions precedent required under this section prior to
the commencement of litigation." What the statute does not
say may be equally important in its interpretation. In
contrast to the governmental immunity statutes cited by
the Appellees, the Act (including Section 78-1412 (3) (b) (ii) ) does not include (1) a limitation stating
"the claimant is considered to have complied with all

9

Administrative Rules, R156-78A-4(1)

(rules to be

"liberally construed to secure the iust, speedy and
economical determination of all issues presented to the
division"); see also Beaver County, supra.

Utah Code

Ann. , Section 78-14-12(1) makes it the responsibility of
the Division to promulgate rules to achieve the purposes
stated.

In addition to having jurisdiction over the

matter as filed, the courts have jurisdiction to find
that either the appropriate rules or procedures are not
in place or that the Division did not otherwise act as it
should.
Appellees cite no authority contrary to Utah Code
Ann. , Section 78-3-4 for the proposition that the
Division at any time has exclusive jurisdiction over any

conditions precedent required under this section prior to
the commencement of litigation, provided that the
complaint was not filed prior to the 180 days available to
the Division to complete the prelitigation panel review";
(2) a limitation stating "no action shall be commenced
until the jurisdiction of the Division has expired"; or
(3) a limitation on the jurisdiction of the courts stating
"the district courts shall not have jurisdiction" or "no
complaint shall be filed" until the request has been
mailed.
The only limitation on filing a complaint is
provided by Section 78-14-8, discussed in the following
footnote.

10

action against health care providers.

The Act contains

no provision stating that the district courts shall not
have jurisdiction.

This is particularly true after the

Request has been filed with the Division, said filings
constituting the only condition precedent.7

Moreover,

this Court has expressly held to the contrary in Avila v.
Winn, 794 P.2d 20 (Utah 1990).

As with Avila, the

present case involved a procedural irregularity: the
Division notified plaintiffs in this case that the
Division had lost the Request filed with the Division and
had closed the file without any notice to plaintiffs.
Depriving the district courts of jurisdiction in a
wrongful death case would also violate constitutional
provisions discussed in Appellants' Brief.

To the extent

that the M.D. Brief acknowledges on page 16 that the
trial court was held to have equitable jurisdiction under
the circumstances of Avila, the M.D. Brief should have
7
Utah Code Ann. , Section 78-14-8 provides that the
complaint must be filed at least 90 days after service of
the Notice. Thus, service of the Notice can be identified
as a requirement. However, no such provision exists with
regard to the mailing of the Request; again demonstrating
a lack of such intent on the part of the legislature.

11

acknowledged that the trial courts have jurisdiction when
a Request has been filed with the Division.

The IHC

Brief also acknowledges on page 25 that Avila held that
the district courts have concurrent jurisdiction, simply
contesting the factual conclusion that the "exception
necessitated by procedural errors and omissions" were not
present in the above-captioned case.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CONSTITUTES AN IMPORTANT
GUIDE TO INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT.

Although the Act need not be declared
unconstitutional, the provisions of the Act skirt various
constitutional issues which should be noted in the
interpretation of the Act.

The failure of the trial

court to interpret the Act in light of the constitutional
prohibitions lead to its finding that the Act deprived
the trial court of jurisdiction under the circumstances
of the case.8

The prohibitions are discussed on the

8 For a complete discussion of the numerous places in
briefs and the transcript of oral argument wherein
appellants raised the following constitutional issues
before the trial court, see Appellants' Memorandum in
Opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition,
dated April 26, 2002, attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and
by this reference incorporated herein. As discussed
therein and herein, the issues raised with regard to
12

Brief of Appellant.

Appellees do not dispute the

constitutional requirements that exist.

The following

discussion is in response to erroneous analysis provided
by the IHC Brief and the M.D. Brief with regard thereto.
The prerequisites of the Act are not synonymous with
the prerequisites of any governmental immunity act.
Fundamentally, governmental immunity acts create
jurisdiction, rather than limiting jurisdiction.9

Because

constitutionality are issues of first impression before
this Court. Thus, no specific Utah authority is available
for citation to the exact circumstances to this case. The
nearest cases applying the Act were cited to the trial
court. Moreover, because the appellant has never sought a
declaration that the Act is unconstitutional, the
reference to constitutional principles for purposes of
aiding statutory interpretation was adequately presented
to the trial court and preserved for appeal by the record
referenced. Although the trial court did not appear to
believe that the applicable constitutional provisions
aided in the interpretation of the Act, the trial court
was aware that the issues were raise, the trial court
adequately understood the constitutional issues and the
trial court issued its decision on the basis of its
consideration of the constitutional principles. See
LeBaron & Associates, Inc. v. Rebel Enterprises, Inc., 823
P.2d 479 (Utah App. 1991), cited by the IHC Brief.
9 The M.D. Brief makes various references to the
governmental immunity act in support of its contentions,
including incorrectly asserting that governmental immunity
is a statutory creation. Had the M.D. Brief more closely
examined the cases cited therein, it would have noted the

13

they do not eliminate a cause of action, constitutional
prohibitions against limiting access to the courts and
remedies in cases of wrongful death are applied
differently to governmental immunity statutes.

Second,

unlike the Act, the provisions of governmental immunity
acts have a legislative purpose of requiring strict
compliance in order to obtain access to the courts.

The

references to governmental immunity acts cited in the IHC
Brief express a much different legislative purpose than
the provisions of the Act.

Moreover, reading each act

independently, the history and purpose of sovereign
immunity is fundamentally different than that of the Act.
In the present case, the trial court had jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann., Section 78-3-4.

While the two-year

statute of limitations is a constitutional limitation on

discussion of absolute immunity to state government at
common law pursuant to the principle of "sovereign
immunity" appearing in footnote 16 of Lvon v. Burton, 2000
UT 55, 5 P.3d 616, 634, cited by the M.D. Brief.
Appellants should have also noted the very different
language of such governmental immunity acts, with regard
to notice requirements that are intended as prerequisites
to filing actions with the courts.
14

actions brought within the scope of the Act,

procedural

requirements that would allow the Division to process and
then eliminate actions in the manner demonstrated in the
present case, without equitable jurisdiction on the part
of the courts, would be unconstitutional.
The M.D. Brief places great emphasis on a number of
cases from other jurisdictions involving medical review
panels.

The M.D. Brief repeatedly cites to Keyes v.

Humana Hoso. Alaska, Inc.. 750 P.2d 343 (Alaska 1988),
which also references a number of cases and similar
statutes from other jurisdictions.

The Keyes court

stated that there was no independent right of access to
the courts in Alaska.

Id. at 359.

involve a wrongful death action.

The cases also do not

Since the right of

access to the courts and remedies in wrongful death cases

10 Cases cited by Appellees, such as Gessner v.
Phillips County Commissioners. 11 P.3d 1131 (Kan. 2000)
(involving the governmental immunity act, including the
u
no action shall be commenced" language) and Kittredae v.
Shaddy, 2001 UT 7, 20 P. 3d 285 (seeking application of the
savings statute, Utah Code Ann. , section 78-12-40) can
further be distinguished to the extent that they involve
the applicable statute of limitations, rather than any
procedural mailing requirement.

15

are constitutionally protected in the state of Utah, the
analysis from Keves, and the other states that do not
afford these constitutional protections, is highly
suspect as to whether it can be applied at all.
The M.D. Brief makes no effort to either (1) compare
the application of constitutional principles in other
states to Utah law, or (2) compare the wording of
statutes in other states to the Act. 11

All that can be

concluded from the M.D. Brief is that other states have
similar statutes.

The defect of Appellee's arguments, in

virtually every instances, lies in the logic that (1) if

11
As discussed in Gessner, supra, the governmental
immunity acting requires only that a claim be filed with
the applicable government entity. The statute then
specifically provides that "Once notice of the claim is
filed, no action shall be commenced until after the
claimant has received notice from the municipality that it
has denied the claim" and u no person may initiate an
action against a municipality unless the claim has been
denied in whole or in part." Thus, the governmental
immunity act (1) contains notice requirements, (2) does
not give the municipality an unfettered right to reject
notices, and (3) requires only filing and lacks otherwise
unreasonable hurdles to secure jurisdiction to later file
a claim. The Act, likewise, is devoid of such
constitutional problems as drafted by the legislature.
The problems exist only as the Act has been misconstrued
by the Appellees and the trial court.

16

a limitation arising from one element of one statute is
constitutionally permissible (i.e., a statute of
limitation or a notice requirement to a government
entity) , then (2) the requirement that the Request be
mailed to health care providers (not merely filed with
the Division) in the present case must also be
constitutionally permissible and, therefore, intended as
a limitation on access to the courts.

Appellees

conclusion that uanything goes" is simply wrong.
Appellees conclusion that the sole purpose of every
provision of the Act is to limit the filing of actions
ignores the drafting of the statute and the importance of
applying constitutional principles.
In Lvon v. Burton, 2000 UT 55, 5 P. 3d 616, the Court
expressly reasoned that if an award exceeded a $250,000
cap on damages, then the substitute remedy provided by
such a statute would not be equal to the remedy
abrogated.

id. at 631.

Although the limitation was

upheld on other grounds, the Court found that the purpose
of saving money for governmental bodies was inadequate
justification for the cap on damages.

17

Id. at 632.

If

saving money for government bodies is an inadequate
legislative purpose for limiting judicial remedies, then
saving money is an inadequate purpose for a special
interest group such as medical care providers and
insurance companies.

In Lyon, the Court held that a

$250,000 cap on damages against a state employee was
constitutional in large part because government employees
are not likely to have personal resources to cover
judgments in excess of that amount.

Such an argument

could not be extended to medical care providers and their
insurance companies.
In footnote 2, on pages 13 and 14 of the M.D. Brief,
the Appellees gratuitously raise a "straw man" separation
of powers argument.

The plaintiffs do not contend that

the decision of a prelitigation panel would usurp the
role of the Courts, since the decision is non-binding.
Of course, no such decision is at issue on this appeal.
The M.D. Brief argues that the Act does not
extinguish or abrogate a tort or common law right, making
Berry bv and through Berrv v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d
670 (Utah 1985) and in Buraandv v. State Deot. of Human

18

Servs. , 1999 UT App. 208, 983 P.2d 58612 inapplicable.
While the Act did not intend to extinguish the
plaintiff's rights, unless it did so by application of
the statute of limitations, the interpretation supplied
by the trial court—that the notice requirement (mailing,
not filing) was intended as a limitation on actionswould involve the extinguishment of common law and
constitutional rights which would be subject to
constitutional scrutiny.

Moreover, the Division, under

the Appellee's arguments would have the right to reject
filed notices, and by their administrative acts
extinguish plaintiff's rights.

Thus, if the

interpretation of the statute advanced by Appellees and
the trial court is followed, there is an abrogation of a
right by the Division in an unconstitutional fashion, as
discussed in Argument III of the Brief of the Appellant.
Interestingly, the M.D. Brief appears to concede that the

12 Buraandv involved an appellant's right to a
hearing, which hearing was held. Thus, no abrogation
occurred. In the present case, the plaintiffs have been
denied their day in court. Until the decision of the
trial court is reversed, an abrogation has occurred.

19

procedural requirements that they support "chill" the
right of access to the courts, which Jensen v. State Tax
Comm'n, 835 P.2d 965 (Utah 1992) declared
unconstitutional.

The prohibition against limiting

access to the courts, or abrogating a right to purse a
claim for wrongful death, is applicable whether the right
abrogated is diminished in whole or in part. Berrv,
supra, at 684.

The court declared in Jensen, that when

(as opposed to in all cases) a taxpayer is unable to pay
a deposit required as a prerequisite to filing an action,
the requirement violates access to the courts guaranteed
by the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11.

In the

present case, when the Division rejects or loses a filing
or fails to provide due process by notice to the
plaintiff,13 the actions of the Division violate Article

13 Interestingly, the M.D. Brief has added as part of
their argument (on pages 11-12) that the 180 days
commences after the Division "accepts" the filed Request.
Thus, in the view of the M.D. Brief, the Division has the
authority to reject a filing, has no responsibility to
notify the plaintiff, and may by any "arbitrary and
irrational" act deprive the plaintiff of the right to file
a complaint with the courts. For the M.D. Brief's
discussion of due process, contrary to such reasoning, see
pages 21-23 of the M.D. Brief.

20

I, Section 11 and Article XVI, section 5.

The courts are

required to measure the actions of the Division against
the principles of ufairness and equality" inherent in
Article I, Section 11

Berrv, supra, at 675.

Statutory

limitations, or administrative actions that have the same
effect, cannot be permitted where there does not exist a
clear social evil to be eliminated.

id. at 680.

In the

present case, the lack of due process afforded by the
Division is not an appropriate means of achieving such an
end.

Restrictions which limit the ability of a party to

effectively pursue a remedy for wrongful death are
"beyond legislative authority."

.Id. at 684.

Finally, Appellees fail altogether to address the
issues of substantive due process, guaranteed by the Utah
Constitution, and Article I, section 7 and by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.

A

statute may be overbroad in its application, and violate
the interests of substantive due process, if its effect
is to limit rights beyond an intended legitimate purpose.
See e.g. State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 191-192 (Utah
1987).

The application of the statute encouraged by

21

Appellees would deny the plaintiffs substantive due
process that was intended by the legislature.

By

interpreting the statue to make mailing of the Request
jurisdictional, the Appellees would eliminate the
plaintiffs' claims without appropriate remedies designed
to ensure that the Division and the courts act to advance
the legislative purpose of expediting "early evaluation
and settlement of claims."
The Division has a responsibility to parties that
file a Notice and/or Request.

As provided by Utah Code

Ann. , Section 78-14-12(1), the legislature intended that
the Division be responsible to see that prelitigation
panel review go forward.

An act by a administrative body

which is taken without notice to affected parties
violates due process.

Morris v. Public Service

Commission, 321 P.2d 644 (Utah).

The policy of Ms.

Bancroft to close files without notice to parties,
particularly where there is no administrative rule
identifying her policy,14 violates both procedural and
14
The provisions of Utah Administrative Code R15678A-7(1), permitting the Division to reject pleadings if
they are not filed in accordance with the requirements of

22

substantive due process requirements.

Absent timely

notice of rejection, the Division must be required to
process a Request filed by a plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
Based

on the foregoing

respectfully

request

that

arguments,
this

Court

the
issue

appellants
an

Order

declaring the trial court to have jurisdiction over the
action, and directing the trial court either to proceed
with the litigation or to order review by a prelitigation
panel, with specific requirement that the plaintiffs be
afforded appropriate due process remedies for the loss of
the Request filed with the Division.
DATED this

r " day of October, 2002.

Thor B. Roundy
Attorney for Appellants

the rules promulgated under the Act, do not indicated that
a Request will be rejected without notice or that a file
will be treated as Mead" without notice. Claimants are
entitled to expect reasonable and timely notice from the
Division.
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Thor B. Roundy
275 East South Temple, Suite 150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 364-3229
Bar No. 6435
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

HELEN LABELLE, SHEILA
CARLSON, LINDA BUCKLEY and
MARILYN PHILLIPS,
individuals and as heirs of
Norma Mary Harriman,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO APPELLEES' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Trial Court No. 010905108

v,

Appellate Court No.
20020204-SC

MCKAY DEE HOSPITAL CENTER,
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE,
INC., Utah Corporations,
DR. IVAN D. WRIGHT, DR.
HAROLD VONK and DR. RONALD
S. RANKIN, individuals, and
JOHN DOES 1-50,
Defendants/Appellees and
Appellees.

Plaintiffs/Appellants, by and through their undersigned
counsel, herewith submit this Memorandum in Opposition to
Appellees' Motion for Summary Disposition.
FACTS
Plaintiffs/Appellants
numbered

facts

respond

contained

in

as

follows

to

the

Defendants'/Appellees'

memorandum

in

support

of

their

motion

for

summary

disposition:
1.

Undisputed.

2.

Undisputed.

3.

The phrase quoted by the Defendants/Appellees is

undisputed, but the absence of any context renders it vague*
and meaningless.
4.

Undisputed.

5.

Undisputed

seeking

to

that Defendants filed various motions

dismiss

Plaintiffs1

claims

and

that

on

a

rehearing of the issues, the Trial Court did issue an order
dismissing
dispute.

the
The

claims.
order

The

basis

of dismissal

for dismissal

speaks for itself

Defendants1 vague reference thereto is inaccurate.
6.

See response to fact no. 5, above.

7.

Undisputed.

8.

Undisputed.

9.

Undisputed.

1C.

Undisputed.

11 . Undisputed.

Labelle

is

in
and

ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFFS RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE UTAH HEALTHCARE MALPRACTICE ACT IN THE TRIAL COURT.
As Defendants point out, reference to due process was
raised

on

pages

5

and

6

of

Plaintiffs'

supplemental

memorandum in opposition to motion to dismiss, dated October
11, 2001.

In addition, references to due process appear in

Plaintiffs1 opposition to motion to dismiss, dated October
2, 2001, the second half of footnote 4, appearing on page
10, discussing Avila infra, Carter, infra, Allen, infra and
Malone, infra, and on page 11 of the same brief.

Plaintiffs

also argued extensively before the Trial Court the relevant
constitutional issues.

See the attached transcript, pages

19-20, 23, 25, 27-31.
Plaintiffs' entire argument was based on the issues of
due process and the concurrent jurisdiction of the Trial
Defendants1

Court with the division.

motion for summary

disposition fails to address the question of subject matter
jurisdiction itself.

As argued extensively by the Plaintiff

in Trial Court, below, the jurisdiction of the division is
merely concurrent with the District Court and not exclusive.
See

Plaintiffs1

October

2,

opposition

2001, pages

4

to

motion

through

8,

to

dismiss,

by

this

dated

reference

incorporated

herein

(including

the

reference

to

constitutionality of the statute appearing on page 8) .
Defendants'
Plaintiffs'

various

complaint

focused

issue of jurisdiction.
largely

motions

on the question

seeking

exclusively

to
on

dismiss

the

single

Plaintiffs' responses also focused
of

jurisdiction.

As

discussed

below, the Trial Court misread the statute and misconstrued
the legislative intent in dismissing the action.

The case

law cited in Plaintiffs' pleadings focused primarily on the
Appellate

Court's

interpretation

of

the

statute

as

specifically related to both jurisdiction and due process
and related constitutional issues.
Beginning on page 19, line 5, of the transcript of the
hearing held December 19, 2001, the Trial Court brought up
the issues that form the factual basis of the Plaintiffs1
constitutional challenge.

The Court specifically stated,

"Well, but see, the rules of procedure really
don't apply, do they?
There are some standards
that the legislature, right or wrong, has decided
to
give
special
treatment
to
health
care
providers.
Whether you disagree with that or
whether you don't, it's the law, and the Supreme
Court says its constitutional, so you have got to
jump through all of these hoops.
It is like the
notice on the governmental immunity act.
There
are certain things that you have got to do."
On page 20, beginning on line 4, the Plaintiff responds,
"Ckay, the next things I have to discuss-and I
think we'll cover that, perhaps to some degree, as
Labeiie

I discuss the issues of due process-but the next
question which has been raised is the question of
whether this Court has jurisdiction over this
case, or whether the Court is for some reason
deprived of jurisdiction."
Due process is specifically mentioned at the beginning of
this discussion and the discussion continues to go through
the process conducted by the Division and covers the very
specific issues raised by the Plaintiffs' appeal.
The

Court

clearly

misconstrues

the

statute

and

the

constitutional issues beginning on page 23, line 2, where it
states, "That doesn't make sense.

If the purpose of it is

to avoid filing lawsuits then why are we allowing-then why
does the statute allow filing lawsuits in the middle of the
prelitigation panel process" (emphasis added) .

The purpose

of the statute is not to prevent the filing of lawsuits.
fact,

if

that

is

the

purpose

of

the

In

statute, then the

statute is unconstitutional as it has been interpreted by
the

Trial

involved

Court.

The

stated purpose

of the procedures

in the prelitigation panel review process is to

expedite the discussion of issues, not prevent Plaintiffs
from going forward.

This is exactly the error made by the

Trial Court and it is the basis for Plaintiffs appeal.

It

is not the basis upon which the Defendants sought to dismiss
the Plaintiffs' claims.

It is simply an incidental issue

that came up in the discussion that resulted in the Trial

Courts' error.

The Plaintiffs' response, beginning on page

23, line 6 of the transcript articulates the argument being
made by the Plaintiffs on appeal.
The Plaintiffs, beginning on page 25, line 23, continue
the discussion of due process.

Due process is specifically

mentioned on page 27, line 16 as the legal basis for the
factual arguments begun two pages earlier.

That discussion

continues through page 31 of the transcript.

Due process is

specifically mentioned again on page 29, both on line 1 and
on

line

2.

The

paragraph

beginning

on

line

11

and

continuing through line 17 raises all of the constitutional
issues that have been filed as part of the appeal.
process and access
on

again

lines

Due

to the Courts are specifically mentioned
21

and

22 of the

transcript.

Specific

references are made to constitutionality on line 25 of page
29.

Due process is again specifically mentioned on page 30,

line 19.
In addition to the fact that due process, access
Court

and

other

constitutional

issues

were

to the

extensively

discussed by the Court and Plaintiffs in the hearing, as
well as being mentioned to the extent they were relevant in
the pleadings filed before the hearing, the Appellate Court
should

Labeile

note

that

the

constitutional

issues raised are a

matter

of

first impression before

knows the Utah Constitution and
United

States

references

guarantee

to

such

that

this Court.

Everyone

the Constitution
due

constitutional

of the

process.

Specific

provisions

are

not

necessary to preserve the issues for appeal, because we can
assume that we are referring to these constitutions when we
discuss

due

Plaintiffs1
decide

Other

pleadings,

this

Appellate

process.

issue

Courts.

impression.

the

has not
These

than

legal
yet
are

the

cases

authority
been

cited

in

necessary

to

established

largely

issues

by

of

the

first

Therefore, the discussion referenced above is

clearly adequate to bring these issues of first impression
before the Appellate Courts for adjudication.
II.

PLAINTIFFS DID FILE A REQUEST FOR PRELITIGATION PANEL
REVIEW, SATISFYING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT.
The

Plaintiffs

prelitigation

in

fact

panel review.

filed

Paragraph

a

request

2 of

the

for

Court's

order of dismissal states, "The Court finds that a question
of fact exists regarding whether a request for prelitigation
panel review was *filed' with the division of occupation and
professional licensing."

The Trial Court treated the matter

as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.
p. 38:19-23.

See transcript,

Therefore, the facts must be construed in the

light most favorable to the Plaintiffs.

The basis of the

Court's

dismissal

appears

in

paragraph

3,

stating

that

Plaintiffs1 failure to mail the request to the health care
providers constitutes a failure to comply with the statutory
requirements that "are compulsory as a condition president
to commencing litigation."
The Trial Court was incorrect in its construction of
the

statute.

The

statute only

requires

that the party

initiating a medical liability action shall file a request
for prelitigation panel review.
78-14-12 (2) (a) .

See Utah Code Ann., Section

The Appellate Courts have universally held

that it is the filing of the petition that is compulsory.
See Avila
Milford

v. Winn,

794

Valley Memorial

P.2d

20

(Utah 1990); Carter v.

Hosp., 996 P.2d

1076

(Utah App.

2000); Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30
(Utah 1981); Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132 (Utah 1992).
The Defendants are attempting to stretch those cases, as the
Trial Court did, to include requirement that the petition be
perfect in every respect as a condition precedent to filing
a legal action.

They assert that the legislature intended

that an imperfect petition would result in deprivation of a
right to bring a legal action, even if it was filed.

They

also desire that this Court should find that there is not
even any entitlement to any kind of due process, such as

Labelle

8

notice

of

rejection

by the

division,

in

order

for

the

petition to be deemed imperfect and unsatisfactory in some
respect,

thereby

denying

due

process

to

the

applicable

Plaintiff.
As Defendants point out, the statute plainly requires
the "filing

of a request for prelitigation

under this section."

panel

Utah Code Ann. Section 78-14-12(3).

The language specifically refers to the filing.
refer

to

any

perfection

of

review

requirement

concerning

content

the

of

It does not

mailing

petition.

or

other

Again,

the

Defendants request that this Court to adopt the reasoning
that

the

words

"under this

section"

somehow

incorporate

reference to all of the other provisions of the statute in
order for the "filing" to be deemed satisfactory.

This is

not the meaning of the words "under this section" or the
meaning of the word "filing".
copy to the

"Filing," means delivery of a

division of occupational

licensing.

"under this section" means the same thing.
only manner that is jurisdictional

Filing

Therefore, the

is the filing itself.

The mailing is not jurisdictional, for the reasons argued by
the Plaintiffs in the underlying case.
If the statute were to be construed such that it made
anything other than filing jurisdictional, this would give
rise to further constitutional challenges.

In Section B of

Defendants' argument, the Defendants point
Utah

Administrative

Division

to

accordance

Code

R156-78A-7

reject pleadings
with

the

if

(1), permitting

they

requirements

out the rule,

of

are
such

not

the

filed

rules.

in

Utah

Administrative Code, R156-78A-9 (2) addresses the Division's
discretion to reject a petition if it is not mailed to all
healthcare providers named therein.

Defendants' argument

ignores the actual fact that the Division never rejected the
Plaintiffs' petition.
petition

The Division's failure to reject the

constitutes

the

Division's

acceptance

and

affirmation that the petition was acceptable and should have
been processed appropriately.

In addition to incorrectly

interpreting

the

followed,

rules

that

Division

the Defendants in the Trial

constitutional
Divisions'

the

should

Court

have

ignored the

issues such as due process

raised by the

failure to give the Plaintiffs

notice to the

extent: that there was a rejection of the petition.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs appeal raises serious constitutional issues
that should be decided after a full hearing by this Court.
As

such,

underlying

the

issues

raised

by

action and presented

the

Plaintiffs

to this

Court

in

the

on appeal

should not be dismissed on summary disposition on the mere

Labeile

10

basis

of

the

Defendants'

inaccurate presentation

of the

facts.
DATED this 7M^_ day of April, 2002.

< ^ 1
Thor B. Roundy
Attorney for
Plaintiffs/Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ^Q^
day of April, 2002,
I caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition
to Appellees' Motion for Summary Disposition to:
JoAnn E. Carnahan
BURBIDGE, CARAHAN, OSTLER & WHITE
1400 Key Bank Tower
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Robert G. Wright
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
7th Floor Key Bank Tower
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Richard W. Campbell
CAMPBELL & CAMPBELL
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84401
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1

ones, I don't send copies of everything I file in the action

2

the other parties who haven't been served.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. ROUNDY:

5

THE COURT:

But In this case Well, but see, the rules of procedure

6

really don't apply, do they?

7

legislature, right or wrong, has decided to give special

8

treatment to health-care providers.

9
10

MR. ROUNDY:
THE COURT:

There are some standards that

Uh-huh (affirmative).
Whether you disagree with that or whetr.

11

you don't, it's the law, and the Supreme Court says it's

12

constitutional, so you've got to jump through all these hoops

13

It's like the notice on the Governmental Immunity Act.

14

are certain things you've got to do.

15

MR. ROUNDY:

16

THE COURT:

17
•18
19

There

Uh-huh (affirmative).
And I think the statute says you shall

mail notice of the request for pre-litigation panel to the
health-care providers, does it not?
MR. ROUNDY:

I don't think it says it specifically

20

with respect to that item.

21

a copy of all the documents filed with the Division to the

22

doctors, or that it will have a mailing certificate, or

23

something to that effect.

24

I don't think it's specific to this particular document.

25

THE COURT:

I think it says that you will mai

There are words to that effect, bu

But in any event, you apparently agree

1

that, for whatever reason, you did not mail a copy of the

2

request for pre-litigation panel to the health-care provider:

3

MR. ROUNDY:

4

Okay.

That's correct.

The next things I have to discuss - and I

5

think we'll cover that, perhaps to some degree, as I discuss

6

the issues of due process — but the next question which has

7

been raised is the question of whether this court has

8

jurisdiction over this case, or whether the court is for som*

9

reason deprived of jurisdiction.

10

Now, under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-3-4, the

11

court has original subject-matter jurisdiction in a very wict

12

variety of cases which would include this one.

13

statute, including the Medical Malpractice Act, that says we'

14

going to deprive the court of that jurisdiction while the

15

Division is handling this, basically a mediation process.

16

There's no

What the Division is doing in this instance is not

17

adjudicating the claim at all, not making sure that the clai:

18

has some particular merit or other.

19

statute, which is stated in the statute itself,

20

Section 78-14-2, is to try to expedite the early evaluation

21

these claims.

22

substance; it's just to make an opportunity, a forum, for th

23

early evaluation of these kinds of matters.

24
25

The purpose of the

It's not to have the Division do anything of

And so the court does have jurisdiction.
nothing depriving the court of jurisdiction.

There's

There is the c.

1

completed before you file the complaint.

2

THE COURT:

That doesn't make sense.

If the purpc.

3

of it is to avoid filing lawsuits then why are we allowing -

4

then why does the statute allow filing lawsuits in the middle

5

of the pre-litigation panel process?

6

MR. ROUNDY:

Well, I don't know what the rationale:

7

might be, but I think that it makes sense that we have a pre-

8

litigation process and let these doctors know of its

9

commencement, which is the part of the statute that I'm

10

referring to about notice of intent, because that is going tc

11

get the ball rolling with this mediation process.

12

going to expedite some kind of early evaluation of these cla:

13

and create this forum.

14

That is

I don't think that the legislature believes that ti

15

is going to resolve all of them.

16

necessarily a need, although it may be preferred, and I thin)

17

even in the Avila

18

but it's not a requirement that the process be completed.

19

I don't think there's

case the court said, well, we would prefer,

Now, in our case, we filed it because we were

20

concerned about the statute of limitations.

When you file a

21

notice of intent to commence legal action, that only tolls tr

22

statute of limitations for four months, and we needed to get

23

our complaint filed so that we wouldn't be here today on a

24

motion to dismiss based on a statute-of-limitations type of

25

defense.

1

MR. ROUNDY:

2

THE COURT:

Okay.
Well, now, tell me again why I should

3

ignore the requirement under the statute for mailing the not:

4

of pre-litigation panel request to the health-care providers.

5

MR. ROUNDY:

Well, I think that one reason is becai

6

under statute, 78-14-12(3) (b) , that statute says if the

7

pre-panel review is not completed within 180 days of the date

8

requested, that the plaintiff is deemed to have complied witr

9

all of the requirements.

10

And so it wouldn't be proper to go back and look at

11

those technicalities, which are things that could be fixed,

12

could be addressed.

13

those technicalities now because the statute expressly states

14

that the plaintiff is deemed to have complied with all of the

15

things.

16
17
18

THE COURT:

It's not proper to go back and look at

For purposes of filing a lawsuit which

you'd already done.
MR. ROUNDY:

Right.

But it doesn't say whether

19

that's prospective or - how that applies, whether it applies

20

lawsuits already filed or lawsuits filed thereafter.

21

says the plaintiff is deemed to have complied.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. ROUNDY:

It simc

All right.
Okay.

I have a little bit more, as fa

24

as jurisdiction goes, to speak about.

Another rule that I ha

25

referred to with regard to these issues of jurisdiction and

1

received without t h e p r o p e r accompanying

2

documents."

3

Meaning she thinks that you have to file the requ€

4

for notice - or the request for a pre-litigation panel when

5

file the notice of intent.

6

"If the appropriate request and filing fee

7

are not received within that time" - meaning in

8

the 60 days - "the matter is considered dead and

9

filed."

10
11

She doesn't do anything to promote plaintiff's
getting notice about a document that's missing -

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. ROUNDY:

14

THE COURT:

15

Well, but - or something like that.
- that's not their job.

That's your

isn't it?

16

MR. ROUNDY:

17

THE COURT:

But it speaks to due process Isn't it your job on behalf of your

18

client to read the statute and comply with the statute,

19

particularly when it's required before you can commence an

20

action?

21

and say, "Oh, the lawyer may not have done this right here.

22

We'd better tell him what's going on."

23

It's not the department's job to look at every not!

MR. ROUNDY:

Yeah.

I understand that under the ru.

24

and the procedures there are things that the parties do as a

25

matter of course in following those rules.

And it's our

1

position that, while we may not have filed the fee, we didn"

2

have notice of it, and we never got any kind of rejection ba

3

The only explanation we have is that the request that we

4

submitted was lost.

5

nothing in terms of due process to address in the Division h

6

you deal with that.

7

And what I'm pointing out is that there

Now, the court has jurisdiction, as we've argued,

8

the court has procedures for dealing with that.

If the cour

9

feels like something was lost, and so that the defendants we

10

deprived of their interest that they might have in having th

11

early, review proceedings or evaluation of these claims, the

12

the court can remedy what they've lost by that defect in the

13

process, and the court can say, "Let's have a pre-litigation

14

panel review now."

15

Or, on the other hand, if the court feels as thoug

16

the plaintiff has done something wrong by not including a cc

17

of a notice on some — or if the plaintiff, not having done

18

something wrong, but has been disadvantaged by the fact than

19

they were not aware that their request was rejected or lost,

20

something to that effect, then the court can apply the rules

21

that we use in the court, such as Rule 60(b), to say we have

22

instance of inadvertence here, and we can excuse that and gc

23

forward with appropriate remedies to address whatever the ne

24

of the parties are in those instances.

25

We need to have the courts involved in their role.

1

looking at the question of due process and applying the rule:

2

that give due process to all parties, in order for the role

3

Division plays to be fair and to be just to everyone.

4

Otherwise, the purpose of the statute is not satisfied.

5

This is not a statute designed to prevent people f:

6

filing complaints.

7

reviewed early on in the process and evaluated so that we car

8

make sure that people are filing meritorious claims.

9

to try _to keep people from having a chance to file.

10

It's purpose is only to try to get these

It's nc
That's

more properly addressed by the statute of limitations.

11

And on the question of constitutionality, the cour:

12

have looked at the two-year statute of limitations for wrong:

13

death.

14

doing in terms of limiting this to two years, and they've sai

15

that's okay; that doesn't deprive anyone of their

16

constitutional rights and due process, or access to the cour:

17

to have a two-year statute of limitations.

18

They've looked at the Malpractice Act and what it's

But I think to say "Hey, I'm sorry that, you know,

19

someone in your family has died as a result of medical

20

negligence, but, you know, you didn't mediate" is not a fair

21

way of depriving someone of their right of due process and

22

access

23

careful about applying this standard of "did you mediate the

24

right way," or something like that, before we deprive people

25

those constitutional rights.

to the courts.

I think that you have to be much more

1

And so what we would ask the Court to do is to

2

exercise its jurisdiction and look at how the Division handle

3

thisf or the specific circumstances of this case, and say, "]

4

going to do what's just, because that is the purpose of the

5

statute.

6

these claims, I'm going to order pre-litigation panel review

7

and make sure that happens so that we honor the intent of the

8

statute.

9

deprive these people of their right to go to court because we

10

had a document lost, or inadvertence," or, you know, whatever

11

it might be.

12

If the defendants want to have a early evaluation

But I am not going to arbitrarily say I'm going to

I just want to look at my notes, 'cause I skipped

13

around just a little bit, and make sure I haven't missed any

14

other part of my argument.

15

I guess one other thing I would refer to would be

16

that the statute that authorizes the Division to adopt these

17

rules, which should ensure due process, is Section 78-14-12,

18

Subsection (1), and I think that that requires that the

19

Division adopt rules that provide due process.

20

it simply authorizes them to adopt any rules that they want t

21

and I don't think it authorizes Ms. Bancroft to simply say,

22

am just going to hold onto these files and not send out a cop

23

of the memo about the filing fee/7 or different things like

24

that.

25

I don't think

I think what it requires is there be rules in place

1

so that people do get notice.

For example, they could have

2

sent me a case number.

3

memo from March saying that we raised the filing fee.

4

like that could have been done which would have provided bett

5

due process in this case.

They could have sent me a copy of thj

6

I think that's all I've got.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. ROUNDY:

9

THE COURT:

Things

Thank you.
Thank you, your Honor.
Response?

10

MR. WRIGHT:

Very briefly, your Honor.

11

Judge, we all know very well, as you pointed out fr

12

the very beginning, that the legislature has determined that

13

health-care providers I guess will be treated a little

14

differently as far as commencement of malpractice actions, as

15

will governmental entities with the Governmental Claims Act.

16

Very simply, as we all know as attorneys, the rules

17

are the rules.

18

claim or a governmental entity, you've got to do certain

19

things.

20

health-care provider, you have to do certain things.

21

Mr. Roundy obviously knew enough and read the statute at

22

78-14-8 to file a notice of intent.

23

turn the page and read 78-14-12(2) (a):

24
25

When you file a claim against a governmental

If you choose to allege a malpractice against a

"(a)

What he failed to do is

The party initiating a medical

liability action shall file a request for

